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2 . The European Balance of Powe.r, 1500-1789 
The years between 1500 and 1789 were characterized by keen 
rivalries, at first primarily dynastic but later national in 
nature, as one state after another sought to establish its hege-
mony on the continent of Europe. Some powers, such as Spain 
and Sweden, declined. Others, such as Prussia and Russia, ap-
peared for the first time as states to be reckoned with. Es-
pecially ~ u 600 Euro ean di lorn ~ jealoUS-~ 
relative osition and securit of their cou~~~~es, __ t~9_ugbt 
of maintaining a balance of ow o~pr~~ _ny. one 
state or oc s a es rom ominating~ the ~GontLnent . This 
idea, like the practice-of diplomacy, has been traced to the 
Italian cit -sta es, whose leaders in the fifteenth century 
s rove to prevent any one of their number from achieving a posi-
tion from which it could control Italy . 
oper ation if a Charles 
reserving 
grandson and successor, Charles (1516-1556), son o a Haps-
burg father, ruled Europe's la~~e$t empire since Charlemagne. 
He inherited Spain, much of Italy, part of Burgun y, the Low 
Countries, Austria, and extensive territory in the New World. 
He was also elected Holy Roman emperor and as such reigned as 
Charles V from 1519 to 1556. The vast area under his control 
was never centralized and, upon abdicating in 1556, he sepa-
rated Austria and the imperial crown from the Spanish inher-
itance . His son Phili II (1556-1598), was a strong supporter 
of Spanish and Hapsburg interests in Europe and an ardent cham-
pion of Counter-Reformation Catholicism. He fought France and 
tried with only partial success to quell revolt in the Low 
Countries . Motivated by both religious and political consider-
ations, he sent · vcasion a,rmada a ainst En land, only to 
meet i nominious defeat (1588) . 
~-;;?~~~;~ 
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Already b the end of n it was evident t ~t 
a ain's re ominance in Europe was waning . Although it had the 
greatest overseas emp1re, - pain never , eveloped a strong native 
middle class, thanks to her gloomy piety and the aversion of 
her nobles to commercial and industrial activity . Such a class 
might have turned to Spain 1 s lasting benefi t the wealth in sil-
ver and other commodities then flowing into t he country from the 
New World. Instead, bu~ · lowed out to more ambiti us aigh-
bo~as rapidly as it was received,_ to pa fo~s and 
for flQods -±Ea::: , · o e sent .a . e r 1c_&.., Mor eover , the govern-
ment tended to stifle economic activity by heavy taxes made nec-
essary by its own inefficiency and financial i rresponsibility. 
In the seventeenth century, as the influx of silver slowed down, 
and as the population declined mar kedly, the gover nment of Spain 
was in the hands of a succession of weak kings , who failed to 
pursue those imaginative policies which might have halted the 
decline . In addition, their ambitiou s polic y o f upholding Haps-
burg and Catholic inter ests involved almos t constant war far e, 
which was simply beyond Spain 9 s human and f inanc i a l r esources 
to s u pport indefinitely . By the middle of the seyenteenth 
tury, defeated in battle, S ain was for ced to ield r ee i 
to e s ;tng 
,-
What a r e now the Netherlands and Belgium wer e known as ~ 
~ow Countries in medieval times, a collec tion of provinces which 
wer e part of the Holy Roman Empi r e and Fr ance . They were in-
clu ded in the inheritance of Charles I of Spain and his succes-
sor s . In~ l500 they ~ex ~be scene of t hrivin mic a tivi~y 
~<l.Qil..i of th ~ . enters of t e_NotillJ n Renai c e . Rev_ol t 
against S anish ru e broke ou t in the Low Countr ies in 156 , 
largely because Phili I i easin is financial and olit-
ica control there and because he was t r y i ng t o stamp out Dutch 
Protestantism. The ten sou ern d 1c p r ov1nces wer e 
soon reconciled to Spain, but the seven northern p r ovinces, 
closely identifying their Calvin ism wi t h patriotism, declared 
their independence in 1581 . Because the Spaniar ds were occupied 
elsewhere, the Dutch, with some English a nd Fre nc h aid, were 
able to fight on until the mother country grant e d a t ruce in 
1609 . The fu 1 inde endence of the United Pr ov i nce s of the 
Nether lands, as the were nown by then , was r e cognized by the 
peace of WestP.halia in 1648 , 
Du .· uch of the e&n-·&b-€H1~fl~ · . _ d Provinces 
was by far the lea i g omm..erci~ n_. inan_c · al powe..r of Euro e. 
About 1 70 it was estimated that the Dutch had fou r times as 
many ships as the British and thirty times as many as the French. 
They carr ied fish, whale oil, spices, and textiles to parts of 
Europe f~om the Baltic to the Mediterr anean . They were the 
leading shipbuilders of the seventeenth century and had other 
important industries . Amsterdam was hen t he fina · 1 ca ':tal 
of Europe , The Netherlands was one of th :v~ex;v.:~f:..:.:...~,__,~~=~ ...... -
Europe which approache~ 'gi..ou s.-t.o.le. 11 ich did o 
~ave r igid censorship . Books which could not be p r inted else-
where were published there . ~eral excellent u niversities were 
in operation . The government which the D~tch established 
( 
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provided fo r a loose confeder a t ion not unlike that which pre-
vailed in the United States immediately after the American 
Revolution. The e xecutive was not called a ki 181 . 
The Dutch were to enjoy thei.r b :r.'ief but spectacular moment 
of preeminence only becaus e o f t he decline o f Spain and only 
until he Fr ench a d En lish wer e in a position to challenge 
them . This took place after about 1650~ In spite of their 
fighting qu alities , t he Dutch lacked the power t o withsta d t e 
concerted efforts o f .-. ese l ar _e r nations " ur1ng the eight-
eent century Dutch 1nvo vement in European politics and wars 
helped contribute furthe r to t he political and c ommercial de-
cline, althou gh u ntil abou t 1725 t hey still dominated the car-
rying trade . 
The Dutch had never a-ctempted to pla y a pre dominant polit-
ical r ole on the Continent . The s uccessor s o f the S a · 
that r espect were the 'F;r:ench . During the sixteenth century 
Fr anc e and t he _Spanish Ha psburgs fou ght each other in many 
places . The Frenc h were determine d to weake n the Hapsburg 
power which threatened t h em on thr ee s i de s a nd which threat-
ened also t o domi nate the Continent . For more than half a 
centur y ( 1494-1559) the two batt l ed for possession of Italy. 
Finally the French aclmitted defeat and t he Spanish influence 
al r eady established there r e mained . Then French energies were 
diverted by the des truct i ve wars of rel igion ( 1562-1598) , which 
seriously weakened r oyal power . When Henry IV ( 1 589-1610 ) , the 
fi r st of the Bourbons , b ecame king , he fou nd many loc al priv-
ileges standing in his way, and was forced t o take u p about 
wher e Louis X:JI h ad left off more than a century befor e . 
One o f France Ys f 
is attentio t o r e 
the Edict of Nantes , 
to worshi ubl i cl · , in 
good fait.h-, the right to ga;rr ison 
~riod of tiJlle . Finding an emp ty 
Henr took ste s t o incre a se t h . v of 
r ich French economy " Canals and r oa ds wer e bu ilt, the produc-
tion of silk was encouraged, a nd t he amou n t of f a rmland was in-
c r eased . But befor e he c ou l d advance t o other objectives, Henry 
was assissinated , 
His s u ccessor was Lou is XIII ( 1610-1643), whose chief min-
ister from 1624 t o 1642 was Cardi nal Ri c helieu ( 1585-1642) , one 
o f France 9 s greatest statesmen . The poli c 1.es whic h he pursued 
with boundless energy and u nswerv i ng devot i o n met with a high 
degree of s u ccess , By execu tin g some French n oblemen and de-
molishing the castles of o t hers he eliminated tha political 
ower o f the nobilit and subjecfea them to the c -own . By mak-
ing u se o r oya offic1a s ca ed intendants dr awn f r om t h e 
r anks of nonnobles y he ace d the r ov i t he kin 9 
ser vice . By the use of for ce e liminated many of the special 
privile ~j who a fter the Edict of 
( 
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Nantes constituted some r espects a state within a 
state . y a war fare, he re-
sume_? the Frenc s ~_:th the H~12.~lmr...gs , S ortly after 
~eath of Richelieu the nobles rose in an u nsu ccessful re-
volt against the government , It was thei r last such attempt. 
Richelieu's work stood the test . 
Absolutism r eached its zenith in Fr ance du ring the long 
reign of Louis XIV (1643-1715), the "Sun King , " Fr ance became 
't!le--model for Europ e in langu a gii liter atu:: · arc hitecture, 
df'ess courtl behavior and - ~ ttca l f or __ , In short, the 
rom the palace at Versailles to the proced~ 
set the pac~ . . Significantly, u pon assuming per-
sonal control of the government in 1661, Louis c hallenged 
Spanish precedence at the papal and English courts, as if to 
proclaim that the day of French preeminence had a rr ived . Louis 
had no nati..ruJ,a.L...,parli~ to curb his powe r o r contr ol the 
French purs'e . Although the n obles r e t a ined gr e a t social pri v-
ileges and fiscal exempt1ons and r epr esented a lar ge drain on 
the treasury, they were scar cely more ±h a n cmu:.ti..exs...-wh~
glitter to the royal entoutag~ ~ The church i n Fr ance was under 
fOyal ~oRtFal . The people in gener al wer e not incl i ned to -ais~ 
pute Louis ' divine r ight to r ule, s u bject only to God . Wi th 
some truth the S]m l{ i :Qg cou ld boU'e sai d ' "I am the state...-J-' 
LouiJ? XIV was the supreme embodiment of t hat stage in Eur-
opean:Politica l development which followed the New Monarchy in 
the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries . Pr eser ving the 
work of Richelieu , he gover ned France as an absolute dyna,s :t._ic 
stat Religious consider ations and the sensibilities of the 
nobles had given way as primary concer ns in deter mining national 
policies to what is sometimes called r eason of state, an ethic 
which places the secular interests of the state above ever thing 
els~ But a word of warn i ng is necessar y . i · , 
like his contemRQ~aries 1 was mu ch 1 ess thoroughgoin~ 
than coul exist 1~ t~e twentieth ~e~t~r~, .and t~t p 1 1n fac! 
ex1st in Hitler ' s German ~Tne me ans of commu nication were 
slll very limitea-In Lo; is 1 day, so that it was physically im-
possible to do many of the things that can be done now . There 
were many long-standing cu stoms and t r aditions which Louis never 
seriously questioned or successfully challenged , For all his 
vaunted despotic power, Lou is was to a cer tai n extent the pris-
oner of his own cou rtJ ~e never fo r ced t he nob1lity to pay 
t axes , Nor did he ever inspire the intense, almos t r eligious, 
devotion which has often char acter ized a bsolu tism in more recent 
times . 
In his finance minister , Jean a tiste C.· ' ( 1619-1683), 
Louis XIV had a faithful servant who cont ' ed and ex nded 
Henr IV~ ,2ro ram--12.._in.s_rease th - RLQducti=v..i.:t nd.. w.eal~ 
r ~uis ~ however, dominated by a desi r e to exalt French 
prestige in Europe, f ri ttered away many of Colbert's gains. ln 
685 e_ revoked the Edic , on the incorrect assumption 
that most Huguenots had r eturned to the Catholic fold and there-
fore tole r ation was no longer necessar y , Mor e than 200,000 
~
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Pro t e _t..rut.t s f 1 e d t h~_£.Q.!lD-t.:tY~,--illCJ.JldJ---n,~,_..mu.Gh-sk:i-11-ed.,....manp.ower 
w~ich Franc e cou l d ill-~~G~~~se . 
Lou is c r eated wh at was Fr a nce ' s f irs~ r eal sta d~~~y, 
an a nny which now wof'~ - trnr·r-or " -,wa s c a r e u ly trained, regu-
lar ly s u pplied , a nd p r o v ided wi .th the best equ ipment of the day. 
For a t i me, Fr ance was the sup r eme mi litary power on the Conti-
nent and, as s uch , it t hrea t ened the Europea n balance of power. 
Lou is ' a t tempt t o r e ach the Rhi ne Rive r , whi c h he reg arded as 
one of Fr ance ' s natu ral f r o n tiers , d r ew v ast, though loose, 
coalit i ons a ga i nst h i m in a ser ies o f wars . died in 
1715 t he r elative Fra nc e had a l r e a dy begun to weaken 
noticea bly . The r e we r e now o t her st r o ng a r mies on the Con 1-
nent! Engl a nd l:! •. d s t a rte d ni bb l ing away at the Fr ench empire in 
the New Wor l d , and t he f inanc ial d i f f icu l ties whi c h plagued 
France in the eighteenth cen t ury wer e a l r e ady p r essing . Many 
in the stre e ts o f P a r i s cursed the Slm Ki n g a s his body was 
b or ne t o i ts gr ave . 
g a ed in what Lou is led the t r a e of a kin . 
cessor s , Lou is XV ( 171 5- 177 4 ) a nd Lou i s XVI 1774-1792) , either 
cou ld no t o r wou ld n o t p r ovide s u ch leader shi p . There are few 
b r ight spots in e i ghteenth centu r y Fre n ch political life . Year 
af t e r y e a r the r e wa s a bu d getar y deficit . No r eal attempts 
we r e made t o distr ibute t he tax burden e qui t ably . Ther e were 
times when i t a ppear e d t hat t he government was oper ating with-
ou t any di r e ct i o n f r om t he s u pposedl y a bsolut e monarch . A 
ser i es of long a nd cos t ly wa r s h ad by 1783 depr ived France of 
mu ch of her empire a nd c on t r ibuted me a s u rably to impending bank-
ruptcy . French p r eemi nence was end ing " Had it not been for the 
f act that Fra nce was t he riche s t a nd mos t p r odu ctive country on 
t he Continent ~ i t would h ave ended sooner . 
I n 1500 Eng l and , wi th a popul a t ion o f abou t 4,000,000 
p eople , wa s no t ye t a firs t - r a t e powe r . Her monar ch, Henry VII 
( 1485-1509) , had es t a blishe d or der a ft e r t he War of the Roses, 
bu t -- i n c ont r as t wi t h the French e x p e r ience --without at the 
same t ime c rea t ing an e x tensiv e bure a u c r a cy or dest r oying Par-
l iament, which st i ll c l 'lm g t o the p o t entially s ignificant right 
t o a ppr ov e new t ax e s . The mor e i mpor tant T.~dors -- Henry VII 
( 1485-1509 ) , Henr y Vl ii ( 1509-1 547 ) , a nd El izabeth ( 1558-1603) --
r u led wit h a mini mum of interfe r enc e by Par liament . Because 
that bod y was in the h abit o f demand ing p r i v ileges in return for 
grant ing new tax es , t hey called i t i nto s e ssion as seldom as 
possible . Bu t Par · ament r ema· r ki a r t of the Eng lish 
syste _e r nment . As we s hall see in a later section , in 
ifie lat e s evente ent cent ury i t se i z e d con t r ol of the state-and 
ended abs~ u :t.is .:L g oye.rilille.llL r tr:E:filila d . 
The l~ter Tudor s realize d t }J.e im:gortance of a na v¥......:t,o-1.heir .... 
island c ou n t r y_, if i t was to defend its e l f a nd play a lar ger 
rOle in Europe ' s a ffai r s . At t he same time, they avoided be-
coming deeply i n volved i n e xpens i ve war s on the Cont· t . 
( 
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~uring the long rei n o commercial. pa~ 
were chartered and English ers (of whom Sir John Hawkins 
(1532-1595) and- S1 r rancis Drake ( c , 1540-1596) . were the most 
famous) preyed u o i commerce with the New World. Although 
these en eavors had the royal blessing and sometimes royal 
assistance, there wer e still no English overseas colonies when 
Elizabeth died in 1603 0 Her pro-Du tch and anti-Spanish foreign 
policy helped bring a gr eat Spanish armada toward England in 
1588, bent on invasion . Its defeat was something of a climax 
to her r eign and p r ovided a considerable qu ickening of English 
patriotism , 
~ ·hough the later Elizabethan e r a was mar ked by internal econ~ disloc ;.~ t ions, incr easing dissatisfaction with the Tudor 
religious settlement, and gr owing opposition to ab~oluti~t royal 
power, the Engli~ still look back upon the r eign of Eli~abeth 
as a gloriou s a ge , One of her contempor a r ies, William Shakes-
pear e ( 1564-1616' , u ndou btedly expr essed what many Englishmen at 
t he close of the sixt eenth century felt abou t thei r country . 
The following wor ds are f rom King Richar d !!: 
This r oyal t hr one of kings, this scepter' d isle 
This ear th of majesty, this seat of Mar s, 
This other Eden, demi-paradise; 
This fo r t r ess built by Nature for hers elf 
Against infection and the ha nd of war ; 
This ha ppy b r eed of men, thi s l ittle wor ld; 
This p r eciou s stone s et in the silver s ea, 
Which ser ves i t in the office of a wall , 
Or as a moat defensive to a house, 
Against the envy of less happier l a nds ; 
This blessed plot, this earth , thi s r e a lm, this England. 
the fi r st half of the seventeenth century the Dut re-
. c 1e r iva ls , .w.~~~ar n 
ded in Du tch defeat , en, when ouis XIV ~~~~~~~~--~=t.he Rnine, Engl a nd -b ecame concerned, not rel-
ishing the p r ospect of s u ch a power f u l stat e at her doorstep. 
The English enter ed the power coali tion for med against France, 
and war began in 1689 0 Hostil i ties we r e carried on overseas as 
well as on the Continent, and what began as a purely European 
cont r over sy settled a own int o a long contest, with the English 
and Fr ench empi r es at s take , This struggle lasted intermittently 
u ntil 1815, a nd fo r that r eason has o f ten been called the Second 
Hu ndr ed Years' War . Bu t al r eady by 1763 England had deprived 
France of vi r tually a ll her holdings in I ndia and North America, 
at an amazingly low cost in men a nd money , It i s difficult to 
say whe t her England was mor e or less power ful than France after 
1763 . The t o st~ganize..d*. th.eir str e g,th_i.n-d4-i-~t 
r anee like ,S.p,a.in, h t hurre · ~y..ing_t_o :m-
the Continent , Engaland on the ad., mp.Aas.i.z.e.d._.b..er 
navy, her commerce, and he r ove _ e As she measured 
power , Englan ad no ter 1763 . 
oq ~
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Ei ghteenth century Eng land was a country busily preparing 
for greatness . The same small size and compactne ss which help 
explain strong r oyal power in the Middle Ages now fostered the 
hi gh degree of national unity and patr iotic feelin g which had 
been achieved . As we shall see, England had experienced a po-
litical revolution after which the a r istocr acy r an the govern-
ment in a way which generally took the i n terests of the middle 
class into accou nt. Economically, the cou ntr y was prospering. 
After 1750 a series of develo ments whi y e come to be known 
as e I ti..a.L.....R.e,volution began, slotl · st transform-
ing England into the wo ' f -:i;cs_ ind:us,;tr,ial natio.n... 
One of thfl most significant d :l.plo:_a~ic develqpJllentB of the 
eighteenth cent ury was t}1e sh . ft . _pgweX::- :ill, ea.:;;..:ter.n-Eu r.ape : 
tne-decline of Swea and Poland a ,d the rise o · 
Russia , In 1648 Sweden was a lea ding European power, the strong-
--est Pr otestant state on the Co~tinent . I t domina ted the eastern 
and sou ther n , as well a s the norther n, coasts of the Baltic, and 
aspi r ed to even gr eater power. Bu t Swe d en, like the Netherlands, 
was a small countr y with limited resources, and it failed to 
stand befor e its r ising neighbors to the sou th and east. Poland, 
in the middle of the seventeenth century, was a vast land stretch-
ing f r om the Baltic almost to the Black Sea , and f r om east of 
the Oder River deep into what is now Russia . It was a country 
withou t any real unity, with an elective ki ngship and a legis-
latur e in which one negative vote cou ld defea t a measure or dis-
solve the session . However , Poland r emai ned an important polit~ 
ical entity u ntil her neighbor s, Russia, Pr ·assia , and Austria, 
par ti t ioned the c ou ntr y among themselves, s o t hat in 1795 the 
Polish state disappear ed c ompletely f r om the map of Europe, not 
to be restor ed u ntil 1919 . 
Br andenbu rg-Prussia had been one of the less impor tant 
s tate s of the Holy Roman Empi r e . I ts r u l er belonged to the 
Hohenzoller n family, which had been i nve ste d with Br andenburg in 
the fifteenth centu ry and which later inher ited East Prussia. 
He was an imperial elector and a Pr otestant . I n 1640 there came 
to the thr one of Brandenbur -Prussia Frederick William, Known as 
the Gr ai_Elector 164 -1688 , Realizi ng that he was monarch of 
sever al scattered and diver se areas, wi t h not much more power in 
any one of them than that of a weak fe·udal king , the "beggar on 
horseback," a s a r e c ent biogr apher calls him, set ou t to u nify 
and strengthen his state . ~Frederick Will iam began by bu ilding a 
~my. ting a n administr a t ion , cur tailing the power 
of the nobles, and in~reasJ.n :lie economic s r e Q,gth o w a was 
a ocr and backwar d cou ntr . He was especially intereste 1n a 
larger popu ation . At his inv itation many of the Huguenots who 
left Fr ance after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes located 
in Prussia , 
When Fr eder ick William became ele ctor, Ge r many was already 
nearing the conclusion of the Thi r ty Years' War ( 1618-1648) , a 
long struggle whose origins can be t r aced to political and re-
ligiou s issu es often impossible to separ ate . Many of the princes, 
both Catholic a nd Pr otestant, had looked with concern upon 
( 
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Hapsbu rg effor ts to curtail their "German liber ties," by which 
they meant thei r au tonomy, in revitalizing the mor ibund imper-
ial power . As the Counter Refor mation s u cceeded in reviving 
Catholic strength in parts of Germany, the r e was increased 
satisfaction with the com romise Au s bu lla5), 
espec1ally as i applied to t ~sp~sii io of chu rch ~ands. 
Mor-e-a-v-e , e a vin1s s resented the fact that their faith, 
which was in its infancy in 1555 , was still denied legal recog-
nition . Fighting at last hr oke _ou.t . ,.in 1"6,18 . Be ~.J?re; it e e_ 
there were Protestants and C:;rt.bp_l .i .. cs fighting on both sides. 
~~riiical issue~~ they were ~ot r edominant- at- the be -innin , 
s u re y wer e lon befor e he Peace of Westphalia recog-
~n~ze the sover eignty of the German s t ates while at the same 
time maintai ning an empi r e in whi c h imper i a l power was all but 
nonexistent. 
I t was once widely believed that t he Thi r ty Years' War 
caused s u ch widesp r e a d dest r uction of life a nd p r operty in 
Germany that her entire life was blighted ther eby fo r more than 
a century . While the dest ruction was indeed great, decline in 
Ger man life actu ally had begun befor e 1618 . Decentralization 
was a political fact long befor e then . As the center of eco-
nomic activity shifted f r om old center s in t he Mediterranean 
and Baltic to new ones on t he Atlantic, Ger man p r osperity suf-
fe r ed. Especially after their unsu ccess ful revolts in the 
sixteenth centu ry , many peasants fou nd themselves r edu ced to 
ser fdom . The war had the effect of a cceler ating these tenden-
cies . Fr ench influe nce in Ge r man a ffai r s was strengthened, and 
fo r two centur ies was exer ted to keep a weak, divided Germany 
across the Rhine . Austria, left with nominal imper ial hegemony, 
had a large population and fe r tile soil, bu t her rulers failed 
to u nify thei r polyglot peoples . Nor cou ld they expolit either 
commerce or colonies as western European ruler s wer e doing. 
==~-1-~ , .c,ies ..... in.U.J. a.t.e~ b¥ 1.-lle G~ E.~Ql' 
we r e continu ed by his s u ccessor54 one of whom won r ecognition 
~other Eur ope an states a s king o f Prussia ( 1713 ) . By the 
time o f King Fr eder i c k the Gre~ ( 1740-178 6) Prussia, with 
fewe r than 3,000,000 people, had wha t wa s a t the moment the 
most effective a r my in ~.e , a capable and ef f i ci eo £ bJi r.e iY.£,--;-
racy, a har d-working_ no;pulati~ and in Ber · st ra . idly 
r owing cap1tal on the Conti A Machi a vellian at heart, 
Freder 1c pursu ed an a g gr essive fo r ei gn policy which g r eatly 
incr eased the size of Prussia and whi ch b r ou ght him, in the 
fi r st year of his rei gn, i n to conflic t with Austria . This was 
the initial campaign i n the long s truggle dur ing which Prussi~ 
wrested leader ship in Ge r man affai r s f r om Austria , culminating 
in 1871 in the c r eation of a united Ger ma ny a r ound the Prussian 
cor e . 
As the r eign of the Great Elector d r ew to a close in Prus-
sia, ther e came to the throne in ~~ a man who is often 
called the father of mode r n Russia : Pe t e r the Gre at_ (l682-1725). 
As the Dar k Ages ended in t he West the Russian people stood be-
tween the rest of Eur ope and a series of Asian invaders who 
IX p. 16 
other wise might well ha ve r epeated the e arlier feat of the Huns 
and the Magyar s . The Russians paid t r ibu te t o the last of these 
invaders, the Tatars, fo r abou t t wo centuries, u ntil 1480 . The 
ruler who thr ew off the Tatar yoke was I van the Gr eat ! 1~­
~505 ) , duke of Muscovy and a contemporar y of the New M~narchs 
of we~tern Europe . Muscovy was onl one of man Russian rin-
cipali ties bu t it · s avor abl ~he :t.ask of.~ uni-
fying the cou ntry becaus~i s ~rut nea :th no.r.._t ..h:::..so.u.:th 
an east-wes t r ade ~tes and becau.se i i bad per s u aded tha 
Tatar s t o ow it to coll th · e f om all th~ Rus-
sian rinq~ . Ivan mar ried the niece o f the last Byzantine em-
peror, and called himself "the r u ler and autocr at of all Russia, 
the new Tsar Constantine in the new ci t y of Constantine, Moscow." 
Ivan extendeg his r ule pver ruij,a,~ .~u::e a.s, ;,r..i,p.liJ.l 
--~ size o f the territor y under his cont r o l . u cce edin ru ~s 
continu e d this olic p~, whi dl b 1789 bad ma<i~ _ 
si est state i n the wor ld . As e a r ly a s 1650 t he pene-
t r ation of Siber ia was comp e e a nd a Russian fort had been 
bu ilt on the shores of the Pacific Ocean . Exp a nsion was more 
d i fficu lt in the west, where Russia n desi r es c l a shed with the 
Poles, Swedes, and the Turks . The goal of Peter the Great was 
to acquire "windows to the west . " By thi s he meant warm-water 
ports through which t r ade in goods and ideas cou ld flow all 
year a r ound . His war with Sweden , which marks the swift de-
cline of that cou nt r y f r om its br ief pos~' tion as a gr eat power, 
yielded a long st r etch of Baltic coast . One of Peter 's succes-
sors , Catherine the Gr e a t (1762-1796), g ·ned a lar ge slice of 
Poland and pe r manent possession of the norther n coast of the 
Black Sea . Bu t the acqu isition of wha t Russia consider s a 
satisfactor~~window to the Mediterra nean e ven toda y remains to 
be complete~ 
Russian ol i t ic develonm.~_nt_, l ike .Jh~a t :h.f.l .. J~ ... l?-~ W!:s t., was 
in tne dir ec t ion of absolu ism . An ins t i tuti on which might 
ave become a parii amen faded into insignifica nce after the 
seventeenth century , leaving the power of the tsar u nchallenged . 
Absolu tism · · s scarce! a ccompan ied and modified, as 
~ was in the Wes~ . b t r ade and comme r ce t own life, an 
the ideas associated with these evelopments . he nobility 
stood by tlie c r own becau se it left em 1n c ontrol of local 
gover nmen t , because it exempted them f r om taxa t ion , a nd also 
bec au se it made no real attempt t o end serfdom, a n institution 
which had appeared in Russi ~ only as t he ser fs in most of West-
ern Eu rope we r e being f r eed ·p The r educt i on o f t he f r ee Russian 
peasant to ser fdom was the p r ice whi c h the tsar had been will ~ 
ing to pay in or der to gain the s u pport of t he Russian nobility. 
Of a popu lation i n 1800 approximating 36,000 , 000, which was al-
most one fifth of the population of Europe , a l l bu t about 
2,000 , 000 wer e ser fs " 
( 
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~rtisans . Historically, Russian cultu ral ties had been with 
Byzantium, from which it had adapted its r eligion, law, art, 
architecture, and techniques of gover nment , Also, during the 
centuries when Mongols occ~ied par t of the country, an Asian 
influence was introduced , Russia had not participated in the 
various stages of an unfol 1ng Wester n Civilization ~ the re-
vival of trade and commerce, the Crusades, the Renai~~ance, or 
the Reformation , It scarcely knew the p r inting pres~ 
;(n 1697 Peter took 50 young Russians on a western tour, seek~g (unsuccessfully, it turned ou t ) military aid against 
the Turks . He used the opportu nity to learn everything he 
cou ld abou t Western ways, particular ly science and technology 
in such advanced commercial countries as the Netherlands and 
England , This trip was a lasting influ ence on Peter's subse-
quent domestic policy, providing the inspiration for such 
things as the Wester n calendar ( bu t the one which the West was 
then discarding) , a simplified a lphabet , We ster n d r ess, an end 
to the secu lsion of noblewomen, a n academy of science, Western 
bureaucracy, embassies at the principal c ourts of Europe, and 
a new capital at St . Petersburg . Later in the eighteenth cen-
tury his s u ccessors became deeply involved in the Europea~ 
balance of power and par ticipated in i t s alliances and wa~ 
~~~~~~~~~~u:--.......,.~~Q- .E.._e.:t e x th~ea. depeoos- . p-Gn 
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~ugnt ussia wi h1n the infla saee of Wp~ er Civilizatiqp_as 
it had never been before . However, he was p r imar ily interested 
in the-miT1~ry and governmental aspects of that civilization, 
and did little to change the cultu re of the great mass of his 
people . When he died, Ru ssia was still far from being Western-
ized . Perhaps the shar pest criticism of his r eign is that by 
int r odu cing a fairly r apid change at t he top of Ru ssian society, 
Peter separ ated the rulers and the ruled without at the same 
time p r oviding any means eventually to close t he gap thus cre-
ated . As a r esu lt, the division betwe en the u pper and lower 
classes persisted into the twentieth centur y . Beyond that, not 
even the upper classes could agree on whether to accept or re-
ject f ur ther Westernization of their cou ntr y . Those who were 
opposed held tenaciously to the belief that Russian cu lture was 
far s uper ior to any other in the wor ld . They believed that 
Moscow -- not Rome and cer tainly not Geneva -- was the exclusive 
cen t e r of the true fai t h, the rightful s u c cessor of Constanti-
nople after that city fell to the Ottoman Turks . These oppon-
ents of Westernization detested St . Peter sburg and wanted to 
continu e the practice of segregating fo r eigner s in Ru ssia . ~ 
may be that even t hose Ru ssians who favor ed Wester nization 
sca~~ely u nderstood the values which Wes t e r ner s professed to 
ho~ 
